ISBN-10:
0792330110
ISBN-13:
9780792330110
Pub. Date:
07/31/1994
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands
Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis / Edition 1

Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis / Edition 1

by J.F. Mertens, S. Sorin

Hardcover

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Overview

This book presents the first systematic exposition of the use of game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis. Rather than focusing on single concepts it covers all basic equivalence theorems — core, bargaining set, Shapley and Harsanyi value, Nash equilibria — including an axiomatic approach to them. It treats thoroughly the value of large games, and the new tools used in the strategic approach to general equilibrium.
The different chapters are written by leaders of their respective fields. The book is primarily addressed to researchers and advanced graduate students, but being largely self-contained, it can also be used as a text for a course.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780792330110
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Publication date: 07/31/1994
Series: Nato Science Series D: , #77
Edition description: 1994
Pages: 268
Sales rank: 898,925
Product dimensions: 8.27(w) x 11.69(h) x 0.24(d)

Table of Contents

List of Figures. List of Authors. Introduction; J.-F. Mertens. A: The Core and the Bargaining Set. I. General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results; E. Allen, S. Sorin. II. Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies; R.M. Anderson. III. Economies with Atoms; J.-F. Mertens. IV. Bargaining Sets; R. Vohra. B: The Value. V. The Shapley Value; R.J. Aumann. VI. Value of Games with a Continuum of Players; A. Neyman. VII. The TU Value: the Non-Differentiable Case; J.-F. Mertens. Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist; F. Lefèvre. VIII. The Harsanyi Value; S. Hart. IX. Value Equivalence Theorems: the TU and NTU Cases; S. Hart. X. Economic Applications of the Shapley Value; R.J. Aumann. C: The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games. XI. An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon; P. Dubey, A. Neyman. XII. Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups; M.H. Wooders. D: The Non-Cooperative Approach. XIII. Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results; P. Dubey. XIV. From Nash to Walras Equilibrium; E. Allen, H. Polemarchakis. XV. Correlated and Communication Equilibria; J.-F. Mertens. XVI. Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium; J. Peck. XVII. Implementation with Plain Conversation; S. Sorin.

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